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COVER

      This map of the grounds of the World's Industrial
and Cotton Centennial Exposition appears in The New Orleans
Guide and Exposition Handbook published in 1885 by James
S. Zacharie and printed by L. Graham and Son of New Orleans.
The library of Loyola University possesses a copy of this hand-
book in its rare book room.

      The exposition was conceived in 1882 at a meeting of
the National Cotton Planters Association, as a means of cel-
ebrating the 100th anniversary of the first shipment of raw
cotton to England. The Congress of the United States passed
an act creating the World Industrial and Cotton Centennial
Exposition on February 10, 1883 and a presidential proclam-
ation designated New Orleans as the site for the exposition.
Its scope was eventually widened to include, "... machinery
and manufactures of all kinds and artistic treasures," in
addition to cotton, cotton products and the implements for
raising cotton.

      The guidebook is a 154 page publication which ori-
ginally cost $.50 and, in addition to describing the expo-
sition and grounds, it details the social manners and cus-
toms of New Orleans, lists various accommodations and amuse-
ments in the city and contains an outline history of Louisi-
ana. Specifically with regard to the exposition, the hand-
book describes, "... groves of gigantic old live oaks, the
branches of which are loaded with Spanish moss, a sort of
parasite growth of a dull gray color and of velvety softness;"
stipulates that, "... no money is received in payment of the
admission fee, except the U.S. silver half dollars;" and calls
visitors' special attention to the Navy exhibit in the Govern-
ment and State building, which contains, "... many relics of
the ill-fated Greely polar expedition, which evoke a melan-
choly interest."

                                      E.J.G.

PREFACE

The four papers contained in the 1967-1968 edition of the LUSHA Journal are devoted to subjects in political science and were written under the direction of Mr. Malcolm Byrnes, former professor of political science at Loyola. The wide topical scope of these articles testifies not only to the ambition and ability of the students who authored them, but also to the immensity of a field which finds its proper object of study in that most variable factor in history ---- man himself. Studies such as those contained in this journal, of men in political dilemma, cannot help but impress us with the commonness of our own unique situations and cannot but make us a bit more curious about the essence of ourselves and the essence of our times.

E.J.G.

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by Charles O. Flickner

The appaerance of Willmore Kendall's John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule in 1941 marked the beginning of a rush to revisionism among Lockeian scholars which still continues. Kendall, who was among the first to challenge the traditional view that Locke was a champion of individual rights, was answered in 1950 by J.W. Gough. Gough attempted to restore Locke to the ranks of liberal-democrats in his work, John Locke's Political Theory, by refuting Kendall. Three yaers later Leo Strauss's book Natural Right and History appeared, utilizing Kendall's method of "textual confrontation" to demonstrate that Locke's appeals to natural law were but a disguise for his real goal, which was to legitimize the "spirit of capitalism" and "possessive individualism." An attempt to restore Locke to the ranks of individualists was made by Peter Laslett in the introduction (of 119 pages) to his definitive edition of the Two Treatises which appeared in 1960. Surprisingly, Laslett's interpretation of Locke differs little from that of George Sabine which appeared two decades earlier.

All of these "revisionist" interpretations of Locke's political thought seek to explain the obvious inconsistencies in Locke's treatment of man and his government. On one hand, Locke appears to guarantee man's inalienable rights from governmental claims, and, on the other hand, he seems almost Hobbesian in his elevation of the powers of the state and in his view of the state of nature as a state of war. In 1962 a Canadian scholar, C.B. Macpherson, published The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, which demonstrates a possible explanation of Locke's "inconsistencies" which assimilates both the "collectivist" and the "individualist" aspects of Locke's political work. Using the research of Laslett and the methods of Strauss and Kendall, Macpherson develops a hypothesis of "implicit assumptions" to read into the Two Treatises concepts of government and society which are long since dormant. These implicit assumptions reveal that Locke's inconsistencies are but a reflection of the "myths and realities" of seventeenth-century England, mirroring the difficulty of reconciling the capitalistic practices of seventeenth-century bourgeois society with the post-feudal philosophical and religious concepts of the era.

In this paper we seek to sketch the development of Lockeian studies in the past thirty years, principally by those scholars cited above, which made possible the recent hypothesis of Macpherson. Secondly, we briefly review the arguments

and conclusions which are in The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism.

A generation of undergraduate theorists was raised on the "Locke" presented by George Sabine. In 1937 Sabine wrote that the Second Treatise was "meant to refute Hobbes upon lines suggested by Hooker." This attachment of Locke to the "long tradition of medieval political thought"[1] was based on Locke's supposed aversion to Hobbes and devotion to Hooker. As the early advocate of limited government, Hooker, like Locke, had long been a favorite of liberal-democrats; his statement, " the power of a king over all and in all (is) limited, so that unto all his proceedings the law itself is a rule,"[2] marked Hooker as an "individualist" and by association, Locke also. Sabine concluded his analysis of Locke by declaring:

> The greatest importance of Locke's philosophy ... lay... in the political thought ... which culminated in the great revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century. Here Locke's defense of resistance in the name of inalienable rights of personal liberty, consent, and freedom to acquire and enjoy property had their full effect.[3]

The first dissenters from this "official" interpretation appeared soon after.[4] Kendall studied the text of Locke, without reference to biographical or scholarly advice, and concluded that not the authoratative but the individualist sections of the Two Treatises were actually unrepresentative of Locke's "real" theory. Kendall felt

> that Locke's treatment of the right of property in the state of nature is predicated throughout upon assumptions which are collectivist in the extreme, and that he is in fact much closer to the functional view of property urged by modern critics of individualism than to the natural rights view usually associated with his name.[5]

Kendall recognized, as Macpherson did in a slightly different manner, that many of the inconsistencies in Locke would be resolved if most men were rational and responsible.

> The man who thinks he knows that the majority is rational and just can speak of the right of the majority and remain silent about the duties which attach to that right, because it follows as a matter of course from his major premise that the latter will be discharged.[6]

J.W. Gough's work formed part of the traditional Lockeian interpretation. While recognizing the value of Kendall's criticism, he felt that the "collectivist" interpretation was an abstraction of the wrong part of the Two Treatises. He contended that the government was to "exercise powers strictly limited by the obligation to respect the natural rights of individuals."[7] Neither Gough nor Kendall, however, recognized

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that Locke's "natural rights" were not necessarily the "inalienable rights" of the Founding Fathers. C.B. Macpherson recognized the contribution of Kendall to Lockeian scholarship, in that he had forced theorists to reformulate their interpretation of Locke in the light of the new "collectivist" Locke.[8]

The difficulty of insuring that the majority continued to protect individual rights was recognized by Gough; he stated that one of the weaknesses of Locke's theory was "its confidence in the identity of public and private interests."[9] A difficulty often overlooked until Butterfield's **The Whig Interpretation of History** appeared was that of interpreting writers of another era according to the assumptions of ones contemporaries. Once one ceases this unfortunate practice, another problem arises, especially in any study of Locke. "One must then conjecture what unstated assumptions Locke may have carried into his theory from his understanding of his own society."[10]

Leo Strauss was aware of this problem when he reminded us that Locke's well-known caution may well have led him to cover his real intention by "going with the herd."[11] Today educators are well aware of the problem which confronts anyone who attempts to teach a novel doctrine to the masses. Rather than risk rejection or misinterpretation Locke may well have stated his "real" doctrine so subtlely that only the most alert could discern it. Locke was by no measure an iconoclast; he believed in allowing the masses to remain contented and ignorant. "The greatest part cannot know and, therefore, they must believe."[12]

Strauss took the chapter on property as the central part of Locke's **Two Treatises** and treated the friend of the Earl of Shaftesbury as a philosopher of capitalism. To Strauss, "Locke still thought that he had to prove that the unlimited acquisition of wealth is not unjust or morally wrong..."[13] This view that Locke's political philosophy held a double meaning angered traditionalist interpreters of the liberal-individualist school, especially Peter Laslett. This distinguished scholar, though not necessarily a great theorist, thought that Strauss must attribute "half-consciousness traditionalism or plain hypocrisy to ... Locke's description of unlimited acquisitiveness as evil Concupiscence."[14] Laslett stated that to interpret a text by any standard other that the individual parts was meaningless. Of Strauss's method he felt: "If we are prepared to treat historical texts in such a way we can prove just what we like from them."[15]

> To Strauss Locke's inconsistencies were deliberate.
> ... in his age most people still adhered to the older view according to which the unlimited acquisition of wealth is unjust or morally wrong. This also explains why, in stating his doctrine of property, Locke..

went as much as possible 'with the herd.'[16]
This would enable him, as we discussed earlier, to conceal
his real meaning from most of his readers, while informing
in an indirect manner his intended readers. Strauss saw the
"burden" of Locke's chapter on property as "covetousness and
concupiscence ... are ... eminently beneficial and reasonable."[17]

Another problem area to all interpreters was Locke's con-
tradictory concepts of the "state of nature." The state of
nature in the pre-governmental period is not at all warlike
or Hobbesian; in fact the problems arising from the founding
of property, not **fear**, motivated man to form civil society.
Once the government, or more precisely the political society,
is formed it is very difficult to overthrow. An invasion
and occupation by foreign troops is about the only measure
which will overthrow society. When this does occur, though,
it appears that the dissolution of the government brings
about a state of nature. Laslett admits that this state of
nature "looks less like the Lockeian than the Hobbesian con-
dition, that miserable condition of war of all against all..."[18]

The interpretation of this problem provides us with an
insight into the real difficulty of confronting the incon-
sistencies of Locke. Let us first see Laslett's approach,
then that of Strauss, and finally turn to the best available
hypothesis, that of Macpherson.

Laslett maintains that Locke drew no rigid distinction
between the natural and political condition of man. He ap-
peals to the "confusion" of Locke, presuming that the dif-
ficulty finds its source in Locke's carelessness rather than
in any real problem in the existential order which formed the
theory.

> His intention in the rather confused argument in this
> chapter may have been to insist on the efficacy of a
> threat to return to the state of nature -- a present
> sanction, we are to believe, both when government ex-
> ists and when it does not, and particularly at that
> point of crisis when no one is quite sure, which is as
> far as what we call anarchy ever really goes. But this
> interpretation is suggested by the whole tenor of this
> doctrine, rather than demonstrated by his statements.[19]

The final sentence exposes the author who writes that a "view
... based on a reading of ... texts ... is so arbitrary and
so concerned to discover a 'real meaning' that it is quite
unacceptable."[20]

Strauss emphasizes that Locke teaches that society and
government are mutually dependent on one another.

> The contradiction disappears if one considers the fact
> that society exists, and acts, without government only
> in the moment of revolution. If society or 'the people,'
> could not exist and hence not act while there is no

government, i.e. no lawful government, there could be no action of 'the people' against the <u>de</u> <u>facto</u> government.[21]

Thus a revolution becomes a majority action in which a new government is established in virtually the same instant that the old one is abolished. Whence comes the threatened return to the state of nature?

Macpherson agrees with Strauss, but does not feel that "the concealment hypothesis ... can ... explain all that has to be explained ..."[22] Macpherson feels that the more complete answer can be found in seeking social assumptions which have been left unstated or only imperfectly so.

> It would be **surprising** if political theorists did always state all their assumptions clearly. Two probable reasons for their not doing so are fairly obvious. First, where a writer can take it for granted that his readers will share some of his assumptions, he will see no need to set these out ... A second reason for a theorist's failure to state an assumption clearly is that he may not be clearly aware of it ... He may have deliberately concealed or disguised some of them, either from fear of offending the readers whom he wanted to convert to his conclusions, or from fear of persecution.[23]

After viewing the numerous theories of the traditionalist and the revisionist schools of theory, Macpherson explains what appears to him to be the main difficulty in an interpretation of John Locke:

> Why should Locke have said, and what could he have meant by **saying**, both that men on the whole are rational and that most of them are not; both that the state of nature is rational, peaceable, and social, and that it is not. If we can explain this we can scarcely claim to have understood Locke's political theory.
> All these contradictions and ambiguities in the theory can be explained, I shall argue, by Locke having read back into the nature of men and society certain preconceptions about the nature of seventeenth-century man and society which he generalized quite unhistorically, and compounded, rather unsystematically, with traditional conceptions such as those to which he assented in his frequent invocations of Hooker.[24]

We start an analysis of Locke's <u>Two</u> <u>Treatises</u> by affirming that the chief reason that men set up civil governments is to preserve their property. Furthermore, it is shown that men have a right to property while in the state of nature, thus property is a natural right. To Macpherson, "Locke's astonishing achievement was to base the property right on natural right and natural law, and then to remove all the natural law limits from the property right."[25]

The analysis proceeds to show that property, in the sense

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of land, arises from man's right to preserve his life and the postulate that his labor is his own. The initial limitations on appropriation in the "original" state of nature, which are used by Laslett and others who prefer to read texts without penetrating them to deny Locke's capitalist justification, are transcended once the introduction of property transforms the whole"structure" of the state of nature. Since men in the state of nature are capable of making contracts other than that which establishes civil government, they give their consent to the introduction of money, thus allowing one to gather more than he needs without danger of spoilage.

> There are ... two levels of consent in Locke's theory. One is the consent between free, equal, rational men in the state of nature to put a value on money ...: it leaves men still in the state of nature, and entitles them to still larger possessions there than they could otherwise have had. The other level of consent is the agreement of each to hand over all his powers to the majority; this is the consent that establishes civil society.
>
> The temporal sequence involves three states in all: two stages of the state of nature (one before, and one after, consent to money and unequal possessions), followed by civil society.[26]

Thus Locke establishes property in excess of the original natural limits as a product of man's individual consent while in the state of nature, and thus a natural right, existent to civil government.[27]

> With the removal of the initial limitations which Locke had explicitly recognized, the whole theory of property is a justification of the natural right not only to unequal property but also to unlimited individual appropriation.[28]

This is exactly what we quoted Strauss as saying on page six, earlier. The difference, though, is that Macpherson does not make Locke the"conscious"philosopher of the emerging capitalists, but only the philosopher "unconsciously" of the unarticulated movements in his society. An additional "implicit assumption" of seventeenth-century England is the class differentiation. The bourgeois society demanded theoretical equality of all men, but refused to accept the "irrational" element as capable of participating in politics.

> All men were equal in natural rights; yet there were two distinct orders of possession of natural rights. Here we have the source of the extraordinary contradiction in Locke's presentation of human nature.[29]

In the final analysis it was Locke's comprehension of his own society that was ambiguous and contradictory.

> It reflected accurately enough the ambivalence of an

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emerging bourgeois society which demanded formal equaltiy but required substantive inequality of rights. The leaders of that society were not prepared to abandon traditional moral law in favour of a fully materialist doctrine of utility. Rightly or wrongly, such a doctrine of utility was thought to be too dangerous to the fabric of society. As long as it was thought so, it was necessary to profess the natural equality of men and to clothe that equality in natural law, and equally necessary to find a natural justification of inequality. Locke did both, to the general satisfaction of his contemporary readers. And if this left at the heart of his theory an ambiguity which pervaded all the rest of it, that made the theory no less serviceable to his own society.[30]

In the end Strauss, Macpherson,[31] and Kendall[32] agree on the question of Locke's ambiguity over the strict property rights and majority rule. For Locke there is no conflict, for the majority is not numerical but is the body of property-holders themselves. The government must hold power over individuals in order that the mass and the unscrupulous among the "rational" men may not threaten the property of the "majority."

Permit Macpherson to sum up his interpretation of Locke: We have seen how Locke, by carrying into the postulates of the Second Treatise the implicit assumption of class differential rationality and rights, reached an ambiguous theory of differential membership ...(which) ... concealed the contradiction in his individualism, in which full individuality for some was produced by consuming the individuality of others.[33]

1. George Sabine. A History of Political Theory.(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1937), p. 524.

2. J.W. Allen. A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century.(New York: Barnes and Noble, 1960), p. 267.

3. Sabine, op. cit., p. 539.

4. see Willmore Kendall, "John Locke Revisited," The Inter-Collegiate Review, II (January, 1966), pp. 217-234.

5. Willmore Kendall. John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule. (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1941), p. 72.

6. Ibid., p. 134.

7. J.W. Gough. John Locke's Political Theory. (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1950), pp. 24-25.

8. C.B. Macpherson. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 195.

9. Gough, op. cit., p. 134

10. Macpherson, op. cit., p. 194.

11. Leo Strauss. Natural Right and History. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 220.

12. John Locke. The Reasonableness of Christianity, as Delivered in the Scriptures, in Locke on Politics, Religion, and Education, ed. Maurice Cranston (New York:Collier, 1965), p. 222.

13. Strauss, op. cit., p. 246.

14. John Locke. Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett. (New York: Mentor, 1965), p. 119; hereafter referred to as "Laslett."

15. *Ibid.*

16. Strauss, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 247.

18. Laslett, p. 129.

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Ibid.*, p. 119n.

21. Strauss, *op. cit.*, p. 232n.

22. Macpherson, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 5-7.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 196-197.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 199.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 210-211.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 218,220.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 221.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 238.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 247.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 256.

32. Kendall, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

33. Macpherson, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland:
A Reaction to African Nationalism

by Michael Morgan

Introduction

The title of this paper is itself an introduction of sorts: Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland: A Reaction to African Nationalism. It is my purpose in this paper to explain how and why the statement of the title is so. I shall attempt to show that while some form of union (which turned out to be federation) was the logical result and reaction of the white communities of Central Africa to an awakening African nationalism and political awareness, that it was this very thing on the part of the Africans that accelerated the death of the Federation. The Federation arose out of the white community's refusal to relinquish governmental control and died because the Africans were determined to get that control.

THE RHODESIAS AND NYASALAND

It is the decade of the 1860's and the place is the tribal lands of the Mashona in the region of the Zambezi River, and the event is the discovery of gold. In far away England, the eyes of an adventurous millionaire were being turned toward the inland regions of Africa, his name was Cecil Rhodes. From the outset, Cecil Rhodes had a virtual governmental as well as economic monopoly in the region of South Africa. This monopoly became greatly expanded when in 1887 the Crown granted to his British South Africa Company a royal charter, and negotiated, at his insistence, a political and commercial,"most favored nation" treaty with Chief Lobengula, who was then recognized by the Crown as the sovereign of Matabeleland and Mashonaland.[1] By the turn of the century, the flag of the British South Africa Company had moved across the Zambezi River to the north into what is now Northern Rhodesia (Zambia)[2] and the British Colonial Office had seized Nyasaland (Malawi) to secure it against threatening signs from the Portuguese in Mozambique.[3]

The political situation remained about the same, that is, under the control of the Chartered Company, until 1923 when South Rhodesia was permitted to vote on a referendum granting responsible self-government. But here we are getting ahead of ourselves so we shall return to the colonial period.

It is important to remember that the colonial explorers approached the African continent from the South, through South Africa. Logically, then, what is today Southern Rhodesia (Rhodesia) was the first area of the Federation peopled by white settlers spurred by the glitter of recently discovered gold deposits. As has already been mentioned, there was, by 1887, a "most favored nation" arrangement existing in the region of Southern Rhodesia. This situation was formalized in 1888 by a treaty with Paramount Chief Lobengula by which he promised to "refrain from entering into any correspondence or treaty with any foreign State or Power, to sell, alienate or cede, or to permit or countenance any sale, alienation or cession of the whole or any part of the...Amandebele Country under his Chieftanship... without the previous knowledge and sanction of Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa."[4] By this time, Cecil Rhodes had extracted from Lobengula the mineral rights to his entire kingdom, in exchange for L100 ($280) a month and 3,000 rifles,[5] the consequences of which Lobengula was obviously not aware.

Under the Royal Charter of the British South Africa Company, permission was given to Cecil Rhodes, as the guiding genius of the company, to raise a police force in order to maintain "peace and good order." The famous

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Pioneer Column and Company Police were the results of this
royal sanction. Composed of 187 Europeans and 150 Africans
this Pioneer Column set out from Kimberley, South Africa
in 1890 to carry out their appointed task in Southern
Rhodesia. Lobengula, to his great dismay, soon found out
that he had signed away in the treaty more than his tribes-
men were willing to give and there occurred a rebellion
within the Matabele tribe followed by a war against the
Europeans in 1897 by the combined Matabele and Mashona
"Nations."

The main result of these events in the South was the
generation of a terrible fear in the Barotse tribes in the
north, which was to become Northern Rhodesia (Zambia).
There, the Paramount Chief of the Barotse, out of fear of
the Matabele and Mashona, asked for the protection of the
British sovereign Queen Victoria, which protection was
forthcoming in 1899 in the form of a "treaty of Alliance"
known as the Barotse Concessions. The major provision of
this treaty which would influence the development of North-
ern Rhodesia was the retention of constitutional powers by
the Paramount Chief. As for the other provisions of the
treaty: it gave to the British government certain adminis-
trative rights and it gave to the Chartered Company most
of the commercial concessions.[6]

As for Nyasaland, the smallest of the three territor-
ies which were to enter into the Federation, it is the only
one of the three that was not opened up by the Chartered
Company. It was Livingston who first reached the shores
of Lake Nyasa in 1859 and it was the missionaries who
followed him who first opened up the region, as much as it
was opened up at all. In 1875 and 1876 the Methodist
Church Mission Society and the Church of Scotland both
opened large trading outposts. It was the Church in Nyasa-
land that from the outset had control of any commercial
interests that existed. These interests had grown rather
extensively by 1891. Indeed, they had grown extensively
enough for the British Foreign Office to issue a proclam-
ation in that same year informing the world that from
thence forth Nyasaland would be under the protection of
Her Majesty the Queen.[7] It can almost be said that Nyasa-
land was conquered by faith, though British military might
was required up to 1907 to confirm the slightly more skep-
tical native element in its newly found faith.[8]

It can be seen from this brief sketch of the colonial
histories of the three would-be bedfellows that the differ-
ent times, places and events which led to their coloniza-
tion, as well as the very different people and purposes
of the events, could very well lead to different develop-
ments with respect to the internal situation in each terri-
tory. Southern Rhodesia was, for the most part, conquered

by the Pioneer Column and thus its natives had a system of power, the White man's power, imposed upon them. This has led to the emphasis in Southern Rhodesia being placed on the economic development of the native to the extent that the White man thinks currently expedient. It is good to keep in mind, when speaking of the White man and his community in Southern Rhodesia, that many of the founders of that community first came to Rhodesia from the South in the Pioneer Column and many were killed in the Matabele and Mashona Rebellions. Thus the Southern Rhodesian White community is more closely linked with that of South Africa than any white community in the other two colonies.

Northern Rhodesia did, in fact, join the British Empire more or less of its own free will and thus retained tribal power patterns and tribal customs. This has had the effect of the British government placing primary emphasis upon social and political advancement of the Natives. The Natives of the North are not economically better off than those of Southern Rhodesia, but they have had a great deal more experience in the governmental system. In Nyasaland, roughly the same lines of development have taken place as in Northern Rhodesia.[9]

The White community of both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland is proportionately very small, much smaller than that in Southern Rhodesia. The relationship of Black to White is much less strained,which is probably due to two factors: 1) the Native in North Rhodesia and Nyasaland has a more functional part to play in the government and 2) there is not so much emotional and psychological attachment of the white community of these areas to South Africa.

The white community in all three colonies has been the deciding factor, the controling factor, in any decisions that have been made regarding governmental policies in the federation as a whole and to a lesser extent in the individual territories up until 1960-61. It is this community, and its policy of social and governmental supremacy over the Natives which has been at the basis of all attempts and failures at Federation in the past. By examining the road toward federation and the politics of that road, the many internal forces which operated towards the recent federation's inevitable break-up as well as those which were its sustaining life can be understood more fully.

The idea of federation among the British colonies of Central Africa was by no means new in 1953. It can be traced to the proposals of the Chartered Company of 1915 which would have united or "amalgemated" the territories of Northern Rhodesia to those of Southern Rhodesia for reasons of economy. The white community of South Rhodesia did not think much of the idea and so nothing more was ever

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done. The proposal was unpopular in South Rhodesia for several reasons. The South Rhodesians, at that time, expected to be granted Responsible Self-Government in the very near future (it didn't come until 1923, however) and any involvement or amalgemation of North Rhodesia would, in the eyes of the white South Rhodesian, be a financial burden. The main reason, however, was the fact that there were only 2,000 whites in a North Rhodesia that was two times the South in area. This made the white settlers fearful that the extremely diluted ratio of white to black would make the Colonial Office in London hesitate in giving control to the whites. In the mind of the white South Rhodesian, amalgemation at that time represented a threat to white control because North Rhodesia was considered unsuitable for white settlement and in the idiom of the time, North Rhodesia's democratic institutions were permanently impossible.

Events moved rapidly after the Great War and the British Government had, by 1927, come up with a different twist for the colonies in Central Africa. It proposed a union of the territories of North Rhodesia and Nyasaland with Uganda and Kenya, to the north. To this, the white community of North Rhodesia responded similarly to that of South Rhodesia in 1915. As a result, the North Rhodesian whites, preferring to look South rather than face native governmental control, sent a delegation to investigate the possibilities of a union with South Rhodesia. This delegation found itself well received in Salisbury, the capital, and everyone seemed to be in favor of the proposal for social and economic reasons, at any rate, this is what was told to the Hilton Young Commission in 1928. Sir Hilton Young, the chairman, had a different idea. He proposed splitting North Rhodesia in two and uniting half of it with the South and the other half with Nyasaland. This proposal put a damper on the whole affair and the actuality of Federation was lost for the time being.[10]

In 1930, there was a sudden upswing in favor of independence in the Rhodesias as a result of a memorandum sent out by Lord Passfield, Colonial Secretary in the second Labour Government. This memorandum contained what is known as the "paramountcy policy." Briefly, this was the policy of His Majesty's government that the welfare of the natives would be paramount. It is understandable that this sudden announcement would cause a stir and agitation for unity and it is equally as understandable that such an artificial interest would subside with the coming of a Conservative government and subsequent revision of the "paramountcy policy." For the next ten years, therefore, nothing was done either to help or hurt Federation. A report of the Bledisloe Commission in 1939 accepted unification "in prin-

ciple," but rejected it for the time being because of dif-
ferences in the Native policy of the "North and South."[11]

The coming of war in 1939-1940 produced new developments
in the economic sphere which were to have most significant
parts to play in the road toward federation, though these
parts were not in the encouragement of federation.

The "swing-state" in the whole affair of federation had,
thus far, been North Rhodesia and it played its role well in
the war years from 1940-1946 and afterwards until about 1950.
As a result of the war, there was a worldwide increase in
demand for copper, almost to the point of insatiability.
During the years immediately before the war and the first
years of the war itself, the total tonnage of the rich North
Rhodesian copperbelt was two-thirds above that of 1937.
Uncertainty about post-war copper demands caused an expected
cutback in tonnage, but the Korean War caused production to
soar again in the early 1950's.[12] This economic boon in
North Rhodesia, combined with an increase of white settler
representation (as opposed to British Civil Service represen-
tation) on the protectorate's Legislative Council, caused an-
other period of coolness toward unification of any sort in
the North because the white community saw Responsible Self-
Government just around the corner and didn't relish the
South Rhodesian governmental control in any case.

There occurred in 1945 a development long overdue, since
it was recommended in the Bledisloe Commission Report of
1939. It was the creation of a Central African Council, the
purpose of which was to provide machinery for co-operation
between the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland. It was, in the
eyes of the government in London, merely a tool to facili-
tate such common necessities as air, postal and banking
services. This CAC was so successful that it had the effect
of destroying any economic argument that had existed for
federation and seemed to cast South Rhodesia as seeking only
political control since the economic problems had been
solved or greatly lessened without actual political union.[13]

Perhaps the most important development of the war, one
that would produce an internal force that would be the ulti-
mate cause of dissolution of the Federation, and one that
was at the same time a direct spur toward federation, was
the awakening of political consciousness within the Native
Community in North Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This resulted in
the founding of African National Congresses in North Rhode-
sia and Nyasaland in 1943 and 1948 respectively. There was
an upsurge of fear of the passing of white control which was
not soothed by the British Labour government's encouragement
of African political organization. Because of its proximity
this "scare" to the North soon spread South and resulted in

the growth of a feeling of "togetherness" within the white
community of all three colonies. This development was just
in time for the South African elections of 1948 which
brought Dr. Malan's Afrikaner Nationalist party to power and
caused envious eyes in South Africa to be turned slightly
northward. Thus, if South Rhodesia looked south to preserve
white control it would be at the expense of Afrikaner con-
trol. Only North Rhodesia and Nyasaland and their white
communities promised an acceptable solution. By this time,
white control was threatened and all three white communities
agreed. The only problem now was the British Government.[14]

It is safe to say that a major reversal in governmental
policy occurred when, in 1953, the British Order in Council
was signed, inaugurating the Federation of the Rhodesias and
Nyasaland,against the unanimous outcries of newly emerging
African political organizations.[15] In the past, the British
government had always been slow to respond to any suggestion
of the federation and when they had responded, it was in the
negative because of the fear of extending South Rhodesia's
Native policy throughout the rest of Central Africa. In
spite of what their previous policy had been, the officials
of the British government, from 1951 when the first confer-
ence on federation took place to actual federation in 1953
seemed to be glossing or deliberately "reinterpreting" the
facts of the government white paper, Comparative Survey of
Native Policy. Reading from this white paper, it called for
no great degree of social imagination to see in South Rhode-
sia a "white-man's" land based upon the continuance of white
rule. The same was true of North Rhodesia to a slightly
lesser extent, but not at all true of Nyasaland. The Brit-
ish government, however, chose to see striking similarities
in the political situations of the three colonies,which un-
doubtedly did exist. These were, however, surface similari-
ties and were no firm foundation upon which to base the suc-
cess of Federation. On the other hand, the deep differences
which did exist were a potent force for destruction. The
British government, while recognizing that differences in
native policy still existed throughout the three territories,
chose to see the ultimate goal of white-black partnership as
the unifying factor in all three colonies.[16] The British
government was very optimistic also about the economic advan-
tages of federation, especially after 1951. In their opinion,
North Rhodesia had the resources, Nyasaland could supply the
black labor force and South Rhodesia had the technological
know-how to exploit both.[17] Meanwhile, back in Central
Africa, the goals of federation of the white community had
not changed.

The British government had agreed to federation to every-
one's surprise. Now, the task of writing a constitution re-
mained. It became at once apparent that if the constitution

proposed by the white community were adopted, all interests of the Africans would be at the mercy of the new federal government. In response to this situation, the British government insisted on the inclusion in the federal cabinet of a Minister of African Interests, who would be appointed by the Governor, with power to "reserve" any African legislation of the federal government for the approval of the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs. This seems to be the only instance in which the British government partially assumed its proper role of leadership in the negotiations.

The division of powers proposed between the three territories and the federal government was based on the principle that the services which had a special closeness to the day-to-day life of the Africans should be provided by the territorial governments. This is what the division was based on in theory, but in practice, the federal government had effective potentials for control of nearly every aspect of life as far as it was to be controlled at all. The federal government was given control of such obvious areas as external affairs, defense, emigration, income tax, customs; as well as those areas necessary for practical control of native policy such as economic planning and development, European as well as native education, co-operatives, health, and town planning.[18]

Perhaps the most controversial provisions of the proposed constitution, aside from the area of control of day-to-day native affairs, was the issue of the franchise. On paper, the provisions seemed to do the job quite well since they insured an intelligent electorate of white settlers with ample room for African advancement into full partnership after the acquisition of adequate education and electoral experience.[19] The federal assembly, to which the federal government would be responsible, was to be chosen under the franchise provision; elected from a "common role" of voters who met any one of several requirements of income, land or education were fourteen Southern Rhodesian members, eight Northern Rhodesian members and four from Nyasaland. Technically, these were of any race. The Africans were to have a total of four elected members, three nominated members and two European nominated members to represent African interests. The only catch to this was that the four elected African members were elected from the same "common role" as the white members. This role, in 1953, was composed of 1% African in Southern Rhodesia, precisely eleven Africans in Northern Rhodesia and none in Nyasaland where an all-white Convention of Associations was responsible for the election of African members.[20] Thus, out of a total of thirty-five seats, whites had control of about twenty-eight. This, in itself, was not bad- it was even necessary at the outset of federation- but no provision was made for the adoption of a new franchise law; instead the qualifications for entry into the

"commom role" of voters were continually raised, making political maturity or advancement of the native population impossible for all practical purposes. Certainly such a situation was fertile ground for the seeds of an awakening African nationalism. These were the seeds of destruction sown when on September 3, 1953, the Federation Commencement Order in Council signaled the first day of operation of the new government.

The policies of the Federation, from its very outset in 1953, were dominated by one single issue, as might have been expected- that of white control versus eventual African rule. This issue would, no doubt, have been a very dominant one in any case, but it was continually kept in the limelight by one man- Sir Roy Welensky, who had been a prime mover in campaigning for Federation and who had become Federal Prime Minister in 1955 upon the resignation of Sir Godfrey Huggins (Lord Malvern of Rhodesia), the first Prime Minister. It was at this time that opposition to the Federation began coming to light in sometimes violent form in the African community.[21] The main source of organization and direction of African discontent had arisen in World War II in the form of labor movements in the copperbelt of North Rhodesia. Since that time the emphasis had swung to the African National Congresses organized in all three territories by 1953.

North Rhodesia was the first territory to produce a really active African organization- one which gave increasingly potent opposition to the Federation. It had in 1952, under the leadership of Kenneth Kaunda, fiercely opposed federation. By 1956 it was powerful enough to stage a successful boycott against discrimination in federal post offices, butcheries, and retail establishments, and it became successfully involved with the election of its own members to North Rhodesia's African seats in the Federal Assembly. By 1959, things had reached the breaking point in North Rhodesia as far as the Africans were concerned, and the African National Congress became the United National (Zambia) Independence Party which advocated secession and independence for North Rhodesia (Zambia).

In Nyasaland, there had been a rather strong African National Congress dating from around 1953, but things did not really "get moving" until the return of the exiled and European educated Dr. Hastings Banda. Upon his return, the ANC was renamed the Malawi Congress Party and immediately adopted a platform calling for secession from the Federation and "one-man, one-vote." The British government, to which the party appealed, turned a deaf ear at first, but the new Nyasaland Constitution of 1960 was rather advanced, advanced enough for Dr. Banda, and advanced enough to give majority control of the newly formed Legislative Council to the Malawi Congress

Party in the 1961 elections.[22] Not much can be said of the nationalist movement in South Rhodesia outside of the fact that it did and does exist under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo. There has been no chance for any such movement to develop mainly because of legal controls on African labor organizations which have been, in all cases, the parent organizations of effective African political movements. Any political activity on the part of the Africans- and there has been some- is not as a result of a well organized effort but, rather, more of a "spontaneous combustion."

The Federation had never been accepted by the African leadership and it was inevitable that from the very outset in 1953, African political organizations should set out to destroy the Federation. By 1959, Native patience had grown distressingly thin and violence erupted from one end of the Federation to the other. In February of 1959, a State of Emergency was declared in South Rhodesia and nearly five hundred members of the ANC were arrested. Across the border, in Nyasaland, cries that violence alone was the only way to success for the African keynoted an ominous situation. By mid-February, large-scale rioting was taking place and a State of Emergency had been declared. Order was finally restored only after fifty Africans had been killed by federal troops and, although things returned to calm on the surface, the Federation's situation was still deteriorating.

With all this as a backdrop, the Monckton Commission, appointed by the British government to study the future of the Federation, released its report. It's findings were that the promises of racial partnership as expressed in the 1953 constitution were a sham. Acting with this report as a frame of reference, the British government in 1960 promised Dr. Banda, to the surprise and dismay of many, a revised constitution which would produce a majority of Africans in the Legislative Council by 1961, as mentioned before.[23]

In 1960, it was also North Rhodesia's turn for a new constitution. This one document could mean the life or death of the Federation and Prime Minister Welensky knew this well. He participated in the heated negotiations which finally produced a constitution with a franchise article providing for a complicated system of voter rolls that, while admitting the possibility of an African majority- which would certainly destroy the Federation- made the eventuality of such a majority highly unlikely. The result was a increase of political activity on the part of Kenneth Kaunda's ANC in North Rhodesia. This forced the British government, by this time under fire from the African majority government in Nyasaland (which had just been promised Responsible Self-Government by 1963[24]),to grant the right of secession to member territories from the Federation. The reaction of Prime Minister Welensky

was, of course, bitter ~~and determined to prevent any~~ such
breakup ~~of the Federation~~.

When self-government did come to Nyasaland, now renamed
Malawi, the very first act of the Legislative Assembly was
to pass an act requesting the British government to recognize
its secession from the Federation. This the British govern-
ment did immediately, thus dealing the Federation one of its
death blows. [25] The other was being dealt in the South
Rhodesian elections of that same year. The white minority
formally, or as nearly formally as possible, rejected the
principle of partnership of the races as a future principle
of operation when it handed an electoral defeat to Sir Ed-
gar Whitehead's United Federal Party and swept into office
the militant Rhodesian Front of Winston Field. [26]

To everyone, even Roy Welensky, it was now obvious that
the Federation was dead. In July of 1963, the representa-
tives of Nyasaland, South and North Rhodesia, and Great
Britain met at Victoria Falls to discuss the dismantling of
the federal government. It became at once apparent that de-
federation would be as complex as federation had been--
but it was accommplished. And so the Federation died an in-
famous death amidst a whispering campaign about secret mili-
tary agreements and proposed alliances which would be the
cause of long continuing friction in the area of Central
Africa.

Footnotes

1. Thomas M. Franck. Race and Nationalism. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1960), p. 10-11.

2. Ibid., p. 22.

3. Gwendolen M. Carter (ed.). Five African States. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 365.

4. 29 British and Foreign State Papers 89 (1888-1889) cited by Franck, op. cit., p. 11.

5. Vernon Bartlett. Struggle for Africa. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1953), p. 216.

6. Ibid., p. 217.

7. Notification of the British Protectorate over Nyasaland, 83 British and Foreign State Papers 142 (1890-1891), cited by Franck, op. cit., p. 30.

8. Ibid., p. 30.

9. Bartlett, op. cit., p. 217-218.

10. Colin Leys and Cranford Pratt. A New Deal in Central Africa. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960),p.1-5.

11. Ibid., p. 9-10.

12. William J. Barber. The Economy of British Central Africa. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1961),p.123.

13. Leys and Pratt, op. cit., p. 11.

14. Ibid., p. 13.

15. Thomas P. Melady. The White Man's Future in Black Africa. (New York: Macfadden-Bartell Corp., 1962), p. 130.

16. Leys and Pratt, op. cit., p. 22.

17. Donald L. Wiedner. A History of Africa South of the Sahara. (New York: Random House, Inc., 1962), p. 485.

18. Leys and Pratt, op. cit., p. 25-26.

19. Wiedner, op. cit., p. 487.

20. Leys and Pratt, op. cit., p. 27.

21. Ronald Segal. African Profiles. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc. Books, Inc, 1962) p. 80.

22. Carter, op. cit., p. 274-275 and 272.

23. Fred G. Burke. Africa's Quest for Order. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. ,965) p. 99-101.

24. Nyasaland and North Rhodesia had remained Protectorates under the techical control of the Colonial Office. Only South Rhodesia was a self-governing colony.

25. Burke, op. cit., p. 105.

26. Ibid., p. 106.

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The Psychological Basis of Human Nature
Hobbes's Foundation for the Theory of Sovereignty

by Robert L. Dupont

The life of Thomas Hobbes reaches from 1588 until 1679.
Thus it includes the most confused and controversial period
in the history of England. Hobbes's theories are an out-
growth of the many controversies of the era, and reflect the
transitional stage that the intellectual world was going
through. Many scholars still ask whether Hobbes was the
last of the traditional political philosophers or the first
of the new.

Hobbes began his adult life about the time of the death
of Queen Elizabeth and the accession of James VI of Scotland.
The Stuarts were destined to become the center of most of
these controversies, although a large amount of this royal
line's problems were merely an outgrowth of the breakdown
in the Tudor system. The internal order of the Tudor govern-
ment was simply not possible any longer; not because of any
peculiar ineptness on the part of the Tudors, but because
the basis of the system depended on external conditions that
did not exist anymore. In his book on the Stuarts, J.P.
Kenyon explains the problem:

> The Tudor system was a voluntary alliance betweem
> a central monarchy and a provincial landowning class.
> But this honeymoon, strongest under Henry VIII, did not
> last a generation. The steep rise in prices forced
> land values down and the long war with Spain produced
> a relentless economic pressure on this land.[1]

English internal security and the power of the central govern-
ment suffered accordingly.

However this crisis in the control of the central govern-
ment over England was not limited to this aspect alone.
The trauma of the break with Rome, although placing the mon-
arch in England in a potentially more power ful position,
was beginning to have undesirable effects. If the time-
honored authority of the Church was subject to nullifica-
tion by the civil government, was not the civil government
itself placed in a dangerous position? English monarchs
were forced to uphold the authority of the Church of England
and to transfer any danger to the civil government as a plot
of Rome, the Jesuits, etc. Sir Leslie Stephen says of the
Rome-London controversy:

> The Christian Church had become a gigantic organ-
> ization with an elaborate constitution and legal system.

It had come into collision, alliance, and rivalry with
empire.
In the great controversies which arose, the Church
had an obvious advantage. It derived its authority from
direct revelation.[2]

Therefore, the identification of Rome with all that endanger-
ed the state was a convenient outlet for internal fears of
the authority and power of religion.

But at the same time, James I made it plain that he
stood squarely behind the Church of England, and its bishops
in the controversies with the anti-clerical gentry. It is
easy to see why:

If the two bodies (Church and State) had conflict-
ing claims, they were also reciprocally necessary.
The state was bound to suppress heresy as the Church
to condemn rebellion.[3]

Furthermore:

The belief of James I in the episcopal institution
was inspired by its obvious utility as an adjunct to
central power.[4]

James amply expressed this belief in the institution when
he said at Hampden Court in 1604,"No bishops, no king." And
with the Church of England in close alliance with royal
authority:

The doctrine of passive obedience to the king be-
came almost an essential doctrine, even with the liber-
al Anglican divines. The rebellion in 1641 was the
result of discontent with both spheres.[5]

Besides the religious conflicts during the era of Stuart
rule, the Parliamentary crisis developed, but not entirely
separate from the religious differences:

In England, the claim of Parliament to a share of po-
wer came first, but it was applied on behalf of reli-
gious Puritanism.[6]

The resulting Civil War and complete breakdown in civil
government had a profound effect on Hobbes.

Men could speak more freely in England, but this
had come at a cost. The central authority of the state
had been paralyzed. To Hobbes, the demands of a parlia-
mentary party appeared to imply a hopeless disorgani-
zation of the political machinery.[7]

For several decades, the political situation continued
intertwined as always with religious differences. For a sum-
mation of the situation we turn to Eric Voegelin in his The
New Science of Politics:

Each of the various groups engaged in the Civil
War was so heaven-bent on having the public order rep-
resent the right variety of transcendent truth that the
existential order of society was in danger of flounder-
ing in the melee.[8]

This is the society that Thomas Hobbes wrote in. His aim
was to present to his readers a political philosophy differ-
ent from any other. In fact:

Thomas Hobbes regarded himself as the founder of
political philosophy or political science. He was cer-
tain that traditional political philosophy was a dream
rather than a science.[9]

Hobbes realized that almost all political writers up to his
day had considered Socrates as founder of political science,
but his claim is consistent with his view of the tradition-
al political philosophy. And the importance of Hobbes can-
not be overestimated:

Hobbes is widely, and rightly, regarded as the most
formidable of English political theorists; formida-
ble not because he is difficult to understand but be-
cause his doctrine is at once so clear, so sweeping,
and so disliked.[10]

Hobbes, as we have seen, wanted his doctrine to depart
from the traditional because he considered the traditional
political philosophy to be defective. He identified tradi-
tional political science with the idealistic tradition; that
certain tradition of political philosophy which held that
there was a right which transcended human convention, that
the noble and the just conform to this right and are there-
fore preferable to to the pleasurable tendencies.

It is here that we can see similarities between the
purpose of Hobbes and the purposes of Machiavelli in his
writings:

Machiavelli justified his demand for a realistic
political philosophy by reflections on the foundations
of civil society.[11]

Machiavelli's aim, then, was to prove the need for his real-
istic policy by examining the society he lived in, pointing
out the problems and defects within this society, and then to
set down the realistic patterns of behaviour that would el-
evate the society from the level of its mistakes.

However, while it is easy to see the similarities in the
two purposes, we must not identify the method of Hobbes with
that of Machiavelli. Hobbes would have considered the poli-
tical theories of Machiavelli perhaps a bit more relevant to
the real world, but no more necessary to it than other theories.

Hobbes was concerned not only with the formulation of a political philosophy, but with the certainty of its correctness.

> Hobbes was overwhelmed or elated by a sense of complete failure of traditional philosophy. Philosophy had not succeeded in transforming itself into wisdom. To succeed where traditional philosophy had failed one has to start with reflections on the right method. The purpose of these reflections was to <u>guarantee</u> the actualization of wisdom.[12]

This necessity for the actualization of wisdom becomes even more significant when one realizes that:

> Hobbes's notion of philosophy or science has its roots in the conviction that ateleological cosmology is impossible, and in the feeling that a purely mechanistic cosmology fails to satisfy the requirement of intelligibility. His solution: Knowledge as the end supplies the indispensable teleological principle.[13]

Hobbes, then, must go beyond the examinations of Machiavelli into civil society. His examination is grounded in human nature and developed in such a manner as to guarantee its actualization as wisdom. "Political theory is to rest firmly on ... human nature."[14] This examination will begin from a mechanistic viewpoint, but will be supplemented, as we shall see, by an assumption which raises the argument above the purely mechanistic level.

Hobbes begins his examination of human nature in the first few chapters of the <u>Leviathan</u>:

> ... the first book of the <u>Leviathan</u> is an examination of man, the matter as well as the artificer of that artificial man, the State. In the early chapters, a theory of cognition is developed from a completely mechanistic doctrine of sensation.[15]

The motion of man, then, is explained by sensation, motion, appetite, etc. Man is self-moving and self-guided. Traditionally, it was thought that Hobbes considered this description of human nature as sufficient for the development of the rest of his theory, particularly the necessity for the sovereign state. However, if we limit the psychological basis of human nature to these mechanistic boundaries:

> ... then his (Hobbes's) psychological propositions do not contain all that is needed for the deductions concerning the sovereign.
> However, if we use the term (human nature) to include Hobbes's statements about the necessary behavior of man in society, then his propositions are sufficient. But these statements are not about the human animal as such.[16]

Hobbes, then, finds it necessary to add more to his argument; a mere examination into human nature as such is not enough. MacPherson tells us:

> The physiological and psychological analysis of the nature of man with which Hobbes opens the whole deductive argument in the _Leviathan_ begins as an analysis of the nature or motion of man considered apart from social relationships. It is, or appears to be, not about civilized man, but about man as such. Yet by the time the argument reaches the hypothetical state of nature, it is about civilized man. Where did civilization get into the argument?[17]

Perhaps we should pause for a moment and consider one of MacPherson's statements more closely, because of the seemingly paradoxical ring to it. This involves an analysis of what Hobbes calls the state of nature. Is it not contrary to assume that Hobbes's state of nature is about civilized man?

Part of the problem is an epistemological one. State of nature is an unfortunate term:

> If the term state of nature were not so firmly entrenched in the literature about Hobbes it would be helpful to discard it entirely and to keep to such another term as "the natural condition of man kind" which is more readily seen to be something within men.[18]

State of nature is therefore a description of the condition of man; it is not in any way a primitive environment.

It follows from this analysis, then, that the state of nature is not an historical hypothesis, but a logical one. The state of nature does not describe an extant society, nor does it describe one which did exist at some primitive stage in the development of man. It is a logical construct.

This point is generally understood by those who delve into the writings of Hobbes. What is not so easily understood is that this state of nature does not deprive man of any historical or civilizational characteristics.

> This understanding (that the state of nature is a logical hypothesis) leads to false inferences. It is often assumed that the state of nature, being a construct, puts aside completely the historically acquired characteristics of man. Hobbes's inference made from the passions could be made from the passions of man shaped by civilization. His state of nature is a statement of the behaviour of man without law, but not without socially acquired behaviour and desires.[19]

A clear understanding of this concept is essential to any

understanding of Hobbes's deductions that follow. The
state of nature goes beyond mechanistic doctrine, beyond
historical inspection; it includes man considered as a
creature shaped and developed beyond mere mechanism.

Proof for this statement is not difficult to obtain.
We can first turn to Hobbes's own method of arriving at
the state of nature. He proceeds to describe the state of
nature by a process of abstraction. The state of nature is
not an observable phenomenon, but a construct reached at in
a process of abstraction from civilized society.[20]

Furthermore, the Leviathan confirms the civilizational
aspects of the state of nature. When Hobbes enumerates the
traditional cause for conflict among men, he names three:
competition, diffidence and glory. The first two of these
go beyond the primitive man. These describe not the action
of a man; they only become intelligible when viewed as inter-
action among men. And these causes of conflict among men
do not arise simply because of the instinct of self-preser-
vation.

> Hobbes's deductions concerning the state of nature
> are from the appetites of men who not only desire to
> live, but to live well. Of the three principal causes
> for quarrels in man, two (competition and diffidence)
> arise out of man's desire to live well.[21]

This is highly significant. A primitive man would not be
concerned with living well; the mechanism,man, described
in the first chapters of Hobbes could not go beyond self-
preservation as a motive. Obviously, the trappings of
civilization have been added.

The Leviathan, furthermore, is not our only appeal:
the Rudiments, another work of Hobbes, tells us much the
same thing:

> ... there can be little doubt that in the Rudiments
> as in the other two works, the state of nature is a
> logical abstraction from a civilized society.[22]

Since we have established the "nature" of the state of
nature, let us return to the problem at hand: How did Hobbes
make the transition from a purely mechanistic human nature
to this state of nature which includes civilizational as-
pects.

> It is chapters 10 and 11 of the Leviathan
> that we find the main transition from man the machine
> by itself to man the machine in a series of social
> relationships.[23]

An examination of the definitions in chapter 10 provides
the answer. In a critical definition, Hobbes defines power

by making use of the following phrases: Natural Power is the eminence of the faculties of the Body or Mind; and, ... as an extraordinary strength... nobility, etc.[24] It is easy to see the divergence from the earlier descriptions of man and his faculties. At this point man becomes more than simply a sensation-motion animal.

> A man's power, therefore, is not an absolute, but a comparative quantity. It consists in the excess of his personal capacities over those of other men. A new postulate is implied in this redefinition of power, namely, that the capacity of every man to get what he wants is opposed by the capacity of every other man.[25]

The significance is easy to see. Man is no longer defined with simply an introspective analysis regarding his self-preservation. Hobbes goes outside of this; he begins to relate man to man before he can describe his state of nature. This is the point at which Hobbes adds civilization to his analysis of human nature. And this addition is highly necessary if Hobbes is to develop his theory of sovereignty. The state of nature will be described by Hobbes as continual warfare between men; and this state is not possible for Hobbes without recourse to this further postulate that is expressed in this redefinition of power.

> He has moved from the definition of power as present means to obtain future good, through a redefinition of power as the excess or eminence of one man's means in comparison with another's. The second definition is established by the postulate that the means of every man to obtain his future good is opposed to the means of every other man.[26]

We can see how Hobbes has added a postulate in order to obtain his state of nature. Without this definition of power as interactions among units of society, his contention about continual conflict does not hold.

The question we must next ask is as follows: Does this new postulate contain any new assumptions that must be examined? Hobbes's assumptions about the mechanistic nature of man developed many of his earlier postulates concerning the emotions, etc. What is assumed in order to introduce this new postulate?

> In the course of his argument (the introduction of man's power as dependent upon the power of other men)he has made several assumptions not contained in the original psychological analysis. The most important is the assumption that the power of every man is opposed to the power of every other man, which appears to be a social, not a psychological postulate.[27]

And so we see that in the final analysis, Hobbes's state of
nature depends, not upon his first analysis of human nature as
sensation-motion, but upon a social assumption regarding the
tendencies of civilized man.

He traces the failure of the idealistic tradition of
political philosophy to one fundamental mistake: traditional
philosophy assumed that man is by nature a political or
social animal. By rejecting this view, Hobbes joins the
Epicurean tradition. But he uses that a-political view
for a political purpose. He gives that a-political view
a political meaning. He tries to instill the spirit of
political idealism into the hedonistic tradition. He thus
becomes the creator of a hedonistic tradition in politics.[28]

The above discovery of the fact that Hobbes's theory of
the state of nature and consequently his theory of sovereignty
is based upon a social assumption, in no way destroys the deduct-
ive process of his reasoning. Hobbes felt that he had firm evi-
dence to support this social assumption, and certainly the events
in England at the time seemed to bear out his analysis of the
social man.

However, in conclusion, it is necessary to relate this as-
sumption to the original reasons Hobbes had for presenting his
theory in the scientific, deductive manner that he did. We must
remember that Hobbes purported to present a political philosophy
that would guarantee the actualization of wisdom, a theory that
would succeed where traditional philosophy had failed. This de-
manded from Hobbes a method of Euclidean constructs that would
follow naturally one upon the other; and the first analysis of
human nature as purely sensory fulfills this demand.

But the psychological basis of human nature is extended
beyond this analysis. Hobbes adds an assumption about man as
a social animal, an assumption based upon observable phenomena,
not upon any previously established construct. The result is
a general weakening in the overall theory and it results in much
of the ambiguity that surrounds the writings and theories of
Thomas Hobbes.

Footnotes

1. J.P. Kenyon. The Stuarts. (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1967) p. 19.

2. Sir Leslie Stephen. Hobbes. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961) p. 176.

3. Ibid., p. 177-178.

4. Kenyon, op. cit., p. 31.

5. Stephen, op. cit. p. 179.

6. Ibid., p. 179.

7. Ibid., p. 181.

8. Eric Voegelin. The New Science of Politics. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966) p. 162.

9. Leo Strauss. Natural Right and History. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953) p. 166.

10. C.B. MacPherson. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962) p.9.

11. Strauss. op. cit. p. 178.

12. Ibid. p. 170. (emphasis added)

13. Ibid. p. 176.

14. _____, Masters of Political Thought. W.T. Jones (editor) (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1966) p. 91.

15. Ibid. p. 93.

16. MacPherson. op. cit. p. 17-18.

17. Ibid. p. 29.

18. Ibid. p. 25.

19. Ibid. pp. 20-21.

20. _Ibid._ p. 21.

21. _Ibid._ p. 24.

22. _Ibid._ p. 26.

23. _Ibid._ p. 34.

24. Thomas Hobbes. _Leviathan_. (New York: Collier Books, 1966) p. 72.

25. MacPherson. _op.cit._ p. 40.

26. _Ibid._ p. 40.

27. _Ibid._ p. 40.

28. Strauss._op.cit._, pp. 168-169.

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The Historical Development of the

Prime Minister

by Mark Silverio

Introduction

Four years ago in 1964 the British political system passed through an important stage in its long and glorious development ---- a new Prime Minister was chosen to lead the nation and the government. It was an event that was a culmination and a climax of hundreds of years of British precedence and custom. For the Office of the Prime Minister has its origins in the transfer of political power from the king to the Parliament in the early part if the eighteenth century. Today the office has achieved the position of the most powerful institution in British politics. Throughout the entire political history of England, one can see the emergence of this powerful force. Its formation was sometimes slow, oftentimes rapid; its history is filled with periods of progression and regression. This historical survey is an attempt to analyse those Prime Ministers and monarchs who have contributed significantly to the development of the modern office of the Prime Minister.

There have been many chief ministers in the govern-
ments of England, but their powers and functions were never com-
parable to the present-day Prime Minister. These chief minis-
ters were entirely dependent upon royal favor rather than a
parliamentary majority. Consequently, the valid history of
the Office of Prime Minister begins with the Restoration in
1660.

Charles II (1660-1685) returned to power in England as
the rightful heir to the throne. The people were now tired of
civil war and political experimentation, as they had in pre-
vious years experimented not only with a Protectorate and a
Republic, but also with a written constitution. Political
life had been filled with religious and moral codes and the
people gleefully turned to CharlesII, hoping to return to a
pre-Revolution era; but this was now impossible to do. Char-
les II could not hope to rule as an absolute king,as James I
(1603-1625) had ruled according to his "Trew Law of Free Mon-
archies."[1] James had ruled by divine right, which meant the
king was responsible only to God, and subsequently received
all royal powers from him.

After the Restoration of 1660, there was no clear rela-
tionship between the king and the Parliament, other than that
there must exist some discernible, viable balance between them.
However, no consideration was given to the relationship be-
tween the king and his ministers; it was understood that all
executive power rested with the king. Even at this early date,
(1660's) in some specific areas, the balance between the Crown
and Parliament was maintained by parliamentary consent.

The relationship between the king and his ministers was
entirely different: they were his ministers, since he had the
power over all appointments. Although some ministers sat in the
Commons, the Parliament held them in considerable scorn and
suspicion ---- even as"spies" for the Crown. At this stage of
development, all ministers owed loyalty directly to the king
and represented him in all policy disputes in Parliament.

The minisetrs themselves did not form a ministry and re-
mained disjointed since, of the many members, no one felt the
obligation to assume the position of "leader." besides, there
was no minister who could control and influence the activities
of his colleagues to any great extent, though some were more
influential than others. As a group,the ministers did not at-
tempt to present a united front to Parliament and the public,
as is the custom today. Those few who were able to gain sup-
port of their personal policies were able to exert some semblance
of political pressure on the king, but ultimately final deci-
sions regarding all governmental objectives.rested with him.

Lord Clarendon was one of those influential members of the ministry and was frequently recognized as the "first minister." In reality, Clarendon's position always depended on the king and his (Clarendon's) ability to persuade the king. Initially, Clarendon was dependent on CharlesII for his seat in the ministry and thus he had no constitutional support at his disposal. Despite his great influence, Lord Clarendon believed that the English people would not endorse the idea of a "Prime Minister." He preferred an absolute monarch over "any monarch who ruled through a Prime Minister."[2] He believed that the ministers had a duty merely to advise the king and to carry out faithfully all Crown decisions.

Another important development under Clarendon was the discontinuance of any consultation between the king and the Privy Council. Consequently, smaller committees or councils were established and these replaced the Privy Council in importance. This was a significant step toward the modern cabinet, although these small committees were still controlled by the king.

The successor of Charles, James II carried forward much the same policy as had his predecessor.[3] He also believed in ministerial responsibility to the king and, like Charles, he appointed ministers holding divergent views. Public opinion was not against this principle of ministerial responsibility to the king since this had always been the general custom and the expected position of the ministers.

With the accession of William of Orange (1688-1702) to the throne, the supremacy of Parliament was established. William took the throne realizing that the principles of absolutism and divine right were no longer applicable in England. Parliamentary dominance began after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 the Declaration of Rights of 1689 was a clear indication of this in England.

William continued along the same course prescribed by his predecessors Charles II and James II: the ministers were responsible to him, not to the Parliament or to the public. William controlled the government himself, attended all cabinet meetings, made all ministerial and lower departmental appointments and continued to make all final decisions of government. Under William came an innovation in the relations between the king and his ministers, because he realized that the easiest way to accomplish what he wanted was to appoint ministers from those political leaders who could best carry the support of Parliament. This was to be an important step in the development of parliamentary government.

The seeds of the Office of Prime Minister were further nourished during the reign of Queen Anne (1702-1714). She continued to assert that the ministers were her personal servants, but she broke the tradition established in William's reign by appointing ministers who did not reflect the majority view in the Commons. Anne, like William, attended the cabinet meetings, but, unlike William, she was not strong enough to lead her own government and many powers and functions of the Crown fell to ministers and others in the Queen's government.

Godolphin, a member of Anne's cabinet, became a "first minister" in the sense that he controlled some important patronage and directed the actions of the Cabinet Council. Although he possessed these powers, he was not a Prime Minister in any modern sense, since he owed no allegiance to the Parliament, but only to the Crown and he did not exercise complete control in the cabinet. Furthermore, he shared many of his powers and duties with Marlborough and Harley.[4]

At this date the Office of Prime Minister had not yet emerged but in the reign of Queen Anne (1702-1714) a tremendous movement toward cabinet government was started. Ministerial meetings in which individual ministers were able to decide whether an issue was relevant or not were held about once a week. Furthermore, the importance of the ministers became clear through informal dinners which Harley held regularly. Through these, Harley was able to select certain ministers and exclude others in an inner group of the ministry, wherein the power lay.[5]

Party identification became important, especially during Anne's reign. Her ministers were not unified party-wise, since she appointed members of both the Whig and Tory parties to her cabinet. This was tolerated because certain influential men in her cabinet, men like Marlborough, Godolphin and Somerset were against one party ministries.[6] Party consolidation was brought about very quickly when the Whigs refused to enter a ministry with the Tories in 1710. This consolidation was to affect the strength of the cabinet, executive authority and even legislative initiative.

Not only was Anne's reign especially important for cabinet government, but her death served the cause as well. The question of succession arose, and the Whigs succeeded in passing legislation in the Commons to call the German Hanoverians to the English throne. Thus the new Hanoverian king found himself aligned with the Whig party and almost totally dependent upon it for the maintenance of his power. It is paradoxical that the Tories did not gain royal favor since they were the traditional supporters of the monarchy principle. As it

was, the Wigs controlled the Crown and the authority of the King decreased steadily.[7]

Under the reign of the first two Hanoverians the modern office of the Prime Minister was personified in Sir Robert Walpole. However, Walpole, under George I shared his authority with Lord Townshend; he handled all finances and Townshend all foreign affairs. It was obvious that this division of power was unworkable and the issue was brought to a head in the Treaty of Hanover.[8] The circumstances surrounding this struggle are important to an understanding of the development of this office. Townshend had negotiated the treaty but Walpole was responsible for its defense and success in the Commons. Cabinet unity and efficiency required, as the logic of its development slowly proved, that ministers agree on political principles, which in practice must come to mean the principles of the most important chief; yet division and chaos followed in the Cabinet.

Lord Townshend lost his major support, court favor, when George II ascended the throne. Robert Walpole now gained full authority in the Cabinet, and with the resignation of Townshend in 1729, the office of the Prime Minister was born. Walpole had not only established the office, but had set the precedent for the doctrine of ministerial responsibility. Yet it must be noted that there was not always a progression, as often Walpole's successors were far weaker in power than he was.

Robert was the "prime minister" and his authority rested on many factors: first, he held court favor until the end of his administration; second, his power centered around strong parliamentary support and strict party organizatiom; third, his administration continued to combine the office of the First Treasury with the Prime Minister. Walpole maintained cabinet unity by introducing the principle of collective responsibilty; in a case where a minister publicly opposed him, Walpole removed him from office. The cabinet had to present a united front to the public, and therefore, any disputes within its ranks had to remain private. Within the cabinet, Walpole was supreme leader; within the Parliament he was leader of the Commons. He continued the use of an inner cabinet and invited small groups of cabinet members to his house for private consultation; now it was the chief minister and not the Crown who was involved in and determined all cabinet decisions.[9]

Party strength and organization were by far the most substantial basis of control in Walpole's administration. He realized his authority rested on the party system and thus he manipulated the Whig party by controlling their finances and selection of candidates. By 1742 he had built a unified organization but in that year he was defeated by a split in his Whig support.

Robert Walpole promptly resigned in 1742 after his defeat in the Commons and thus he established a constitutional principle; he resigned because he had lost a vote of confidence in the Commons. However, this precedent was not considered binding on his successors since the younger William Pitt was defeated several times in 1783, but refused to resign . Nevertheless, Walpole's resignation in 1742 historically determined later constitutional development.

The prestige of the House of Commons was greatly increased during the twenty-one years of the Walpole administration. The ministry now virtually had to be selected from the Commons and in 1756 Newcastle was forced to leave office because he was unable to find a leader in the Commons. When the Prime Minister is a peer, two men are needed; when he is a Commoner, one is sufficient.

The man who did so much to establish the office was never called "Prime Minister." In fact, Walpole denied that he was Prime Minister since a "Protest of Dissentient Peers" had demanded his removal from office, declaring that there existed no such office in the British constitution. The first man to be called "Prime Minister" was Henry Pelham, yet his authority never equalled Walpole's. The power in Pelham's cabinet was divided between Newcastle, Harwicke and the Prime Minister.

From Walpole's resignation in 1742, until the administration of the younger William Pitt in 1783 progress toward cabinet government was halted. Two basic reasons for this were: first, there was much internal party chaos from 1742 until 1770; and second, George III almost succeeded in gaining back all those powers which had passed from royal hands to the ministers.

During the administration of William Pitt (the Elder) the office of Prime Minister and its powers diminished steadily.

The ascendency of the Prime Minister in the past was achieved
by strong party organization, but Pitt was the first of a
long line of popular politicians who obtained their power
from the public will.[10] Internal party division resulted;
ability in office rather than party loyalty were his criteria
in appointments. His ministry in 1766 reflected this, as
it included both Whigs and Tories.

The second major reason for the decline in cabinet gov-
ernment was the restoration of the royal prerogative by
George III. His ideal of government was that there should
be government by his personal friends, not by Whigs or Tor-
ies; "... ministers should be chosen from both parties so
that the government might be based on a 'broad bottom'."[11]
Thus the king attacked the heart of cabinet government by
attacking the party organizations and this meant predomin-
antly attacking the Whig party , for it had controlled the
government since the accession of the Hanoverian kings. The
king did this by political bribery and patronage, as he con-
tinually gained supporters called "King's friends" and even-
tually he won full political power over the divided Whigs.

By 1770 George III was the center of political power
and loyalty, as all the cabinet's authority and influence
now depended on the king. George tried to be his own Prime
Minister and direct HIS cabinet by HIS own means. The height
of his authority came during the administration of Lord North
since he refused to be called a "Prime Minister" because he
believed that no such office existed under the constitution. [12]
Actually, he was not a Prime Minister in the modern sense,
since the king directed all policies himself , controlled
all appointments and made all decisions in the cabinet.

Lord North resigned from office in 1782 because of
the political consequences of the American Revolutionary War.
Lord Rockingham succeeded him against the wishes of George
III and Rockingham promptly abolished some policies of the
Crown. The king, on the other hand, followed the same stra-
tegy that had won for him his power in the period from 1760-
1770; he attempted to divide his enemies again. His appoint-
ment of Thurlow as Chancellor divided the Whigs, and the
death of Rockingham led to the resignation of Charles Fox
and the appointment of Shelburne to First Lord of the Trea-
sury. Lord Shelburne was greatly disliked by the cabinet
and they conspired to remove him from office. Instability

characterized his and all other administrations at this time.

George further ventured to direct governmental policy
when he appointed the younger William Pitt to the Minister-
ship in 1783. The king hoped to control Pitt and thus
enhance his own power, but the fact is that Pitt actually
strengthened the office of the Prime Minister and yet in
doing so, there were never any sharp conflicts between Pitt
and the king. History shows that they were in agreement on
most matters.

William Pitt, the second son ofthe Earl of Chatham,
was the youngest man, at twenty-five, to become Prime Minister.
His concept of the office of the Prime Minister was similar
to Walpole's, that is, the policies of the government should
rest in a "First Minister" and any differences of opinion
in the cabinet should be subservient to the will of the
Prime Minister. William Pitt did much to establish the
modern office but all of his achievements and advancements
could not have been realized without the mutual confidence
between Pitt and George III. Actually, the king had no
alternative to Pitt since his only other likely choice was
Fox who was consistently anti-George III.

The power and cabinet control of Pitt's successors
never equalled his but between 1806 and 1840 ministerial
supremacy over the monarch was established; the crown was
placed in a position similar to the one it occupies today.[13]
Two tests of Parliamentary dominance came during this period.
In 1834 King William IV (1830-1837) dismissed the Whig
ministry of Lord Melbourne and invited Sir Robert Peel
form a government. The Parliament was obviously against
Peel and he knew he could not command a majority in it
and therefore dissolved it and appealed to the public to
return a majority favorable to him. The Parliament (Commons)
that was elected was still hostile to him and he resigned
and Melbourne was returned to power. This proved, regard-
less of royal favor, that not simply because he is minister
will a Prime Minister control the Commons.

Another test came in the reign of Queen Victoria.
It is of lesser importance than the first but yet it further
illustrates the transfer of power from the monarch to the
Prime Minister. When Victoria ascended the throne in 1837

Lord Melbourne was still in office. The ladies of the bed-
chamber surrounding Victoria were appointed from the sup-
porters of Melbourne, but in 1839 he was defeated and for-
ced to resign. Sir Robert Peel was again invited to form
his government and he informed the queen that the present
ladies of the bedchamber would have to be removed since
their support of Melbourne might influence her. The queen
refused and Melbourne was recalled to head the ministry
until 1841 when he was again defeated and Peel was asked
to form his government. He requested the power of appoint-
ment once again; the queen consented and even recognized
that she had been in error in 1839.

Sir Robert Peel (1841-1846) was influential in the
development of the modern office; he controlled and super-
vised the administration of all the departments to a greater
extent than his predecessors had done and more than his suc-
cessors could possibly do. Lord Melbourne's cabinet was
called a "republic" since the Prime Minister had no real over-
all authority, but Peel exercised complete control over his
cabinet and departments. While most Prime Ministers were con-
cerned with only their more important departments, Peel was
instrumental in all of them. He even ventured to introduce
the budget in 1842, which is usually the task of the Chancel-
lor of the Exchequer. A minister wishing to introduce a mea-
sure always consulted with Peel and for this he has been con-
sidered "the model of all Prime Ministers."

Throughout the historical development of the Prime
Minister, it is evident that he and his cabinet were assum-
ing powers at the expense of the Crown. Gradually the cab-
inet became completely responsible to the Parliament for its
power, policy directives and existence. However, the rela-
tionship between the Prime Minister and his ministers was
never really defined.

By 1887 the parties were highly organized and disci-
plined and presented clear alternatives to the electorate.
The Prime Minister was recognized as the party leader and he
could use this power in the Parliament and his cabinet to
determine policy. The electorate saw the party and the gov-
ernment in terms of the Prime Minister. This meant that
no cabinet member could disagree with him on major policy,
for to do so was to risk the loss of party and electoral sup-
port. One can see that the number and efficacy of the weapons
in the hands of the Prime Minister has increased steadily to
the present day, yet the relationship of the Prime Minister
and his ministry was never to be completely defined.

The Reform Act of 1867, supplemented by the act of
1884 increased the voting power of the common man consid-
erably. This enlarged electorate led to a different type

of Prime Minister, one who had to appeal to this new voting block. Furthermore, the increased suffrage made necessary national elections and a Prime Minister could no longer just be concerned with his own constituency. Elections became personality clashes between men like Gladstone and Disraeli--- party leaders who embodied this change in national elections.

This public support of the government brought with it substantial majorities in the Commons. Previously the governments were made to work with slim margins and consequently were easily defeated by minority groups; Sir Robert Peel in 1841 had defeated the Whigs by one vote and Lord Russell in 1852 was defeated by nine. The effect of public opinion can be seen in the resignations of Disraeli (1868) and Gladstone (1874) after electoral defeat.

The modern office of the Prime Minister had come into existence by the end of the nineteenth century. Its constitutional validity was never again questioned after the reign of Queen Victoria (1837-1901). It was clear by then that the Prime Minister and his cabinet controlled the government through the House of Commons and also, it was accepted procedure that if a Prime Minister lost a vote of confidence in Parliament he would resign or request a dissolution of the House of Commons.[14] It became evident that his relationship with his cabinet depended upon his ability, his public support and his party control. The monarch, as defined by Walter Bagehot, had the power, " to advise, to encourage and to warn;" it now exercised the same powers it would in the following century.

With the accession of Lord Roseberry in March of 1894, the office of Prime Minister was established as we know it today.[15] There have been minor changes since, but its basic constitutional foundation had already been laid. Throughout the years men like Winston Churchill, Benjamin Disraeli and David Lloyd George have significantly shaped the office. In the twentieth century the potential power of Prime Minister will be channelled toward many governmental functions and problems unknown in the administration of Sir Robert Walpole. The many latent powers of the office, in the future will determine the general political welfare of the British people.

Supplement-Monarchs of England

Charles II (1660-1685)

James II (1685-1688)

William III (1688-1702)

Anne (1702-1714)

George I (1714-1727)

George II (1727-1760)

George III (1760-1820)

George IV (1820-1830)

William IV (1830-1837)

Victoria (1837-1901)

Edward VII (1901-1910)

George V (1910-1936)

Edward VIII (1936)

George VI (1936-1952)

Elizabeth II (1952-

Footnotes

1. <u>The Political Works of James I</u>. (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1918) p. 201.

2. Bryrum E. Carter. <u>The Office of the Prime Minister</u>. (Chicago: Houghton and Mifflin & Company, 1955) p. 16.

3. The English line of the monarchs from 1660 to 1952 is listed in the supplement.

4. Both Marlborough and Harley were ministers in Anne's cabinet.

5. <u>Op. cit</u>., Carter, p. 21.

6. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 22.

7. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 24.

8. Coxe, <u>Walpole</u>. (New York: University Press, 1953)p.564. Walpole stated, " I do not pretend to be a great master of foreign affairs ... I only have one voice among many." Nevertheless Walpole's voice was more influential than the voices of his colleagues. Regardless of the protest, Walpole actually was a Prime Minister.

9. James A. Farrer. <u>Structure of the Crown and English Politics</u> (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1960)p. 1.

10. L.B. Namier. <u>Politics under George</u> III (New York: Blaisdell Publishing Company, 1959) p. 300.

11. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 308.

12. <u>Op. cit</u>., Carter, p. 33.

ersity Press, 1961) p. 150.

14. Op. cit., Carter, p. 38.

15. R.J. Minney. No. 10 Downing Street.(New York: Pantheon, 1961) p. 441.

14. Op. cit., Carter, p. 38.